There has also tended to be a division in historiography between studies of solidarity and exile dealing with culture, gender or human rights on the one hand and political histories of Evaluating the success of overt and clandestine solidarity during these first chaotic years of the dictatorship is nevertheless admittedly difficult. There is a lot we still do not know and are unlikely to know due to the nature of covert resistance and the lack of detailed record keeping. Cuba's archives also remain closed. However, by piecing together testimonies of those who survived, private archives, and declassified documents, we can begin to draw significant conclusions about this early phase of opposition to the dictatorship, what characterized it, and what it was able to achieve. 
This internationalization of Chilean politics was directly linked to the Chilean
Left's actions. Exiles skillfully appealed to different audiences when mobilizing solidarity.
The composition of Chilean committees, like the Comité Chile in Havana, was also important in attracting support. The fact that Beatriz Allende -Salvador Allende's daughter and heir apparent -was in charge of the Comité Chileno gave it special status.
That she controlled the money raised by solidarity campaigns was also important.
Beyond her active role, Chilean left-wing parties represented by the committee were key.
Because the majority of parties instructed their leaders to seek asylum after the coup, and because these parties had long-standing ties with analogous parties around the world before it, Chilean exiles received support that their counterparts fleeing the dictatorship in Argentina after 1976, for example, did not. 18 Although the MIR initially instructed its members not to seek asylum, it could also count on support from similar revolutionary groups in the Southern Cone, as well as sympathy from the radical Left in Western
Europe.
In short, the Chilean Left inserted itself into global networks like never before. In this way, exiles were able to contribute to the development of global ideas beyond their own immediate environment such as the struggle for human rights and against U.S. support for dictatorial regimes. As well as being fought out in Chile itself, the struggle against the dictatorship, and the latter's efforts to eradicate all its opponents, was therefore played out on an international stage.
Even so, an examination of early Chilean exile-led efforts from Havana reveals that strategies of resistance were not neatly defined nor necessarily joined up. Different approaches evolved simultaneously in a flurry of activity aimed simply at responding to what had happened. As one Chilean exile who spent four months in Cuba recalled, "Our political line...was that we had to wage in Chile a battle on all fronts to get rid of the dictatorship: a political battle, an organizational battle, battles of all types, and, if possible, even military…One of the fronts was the diplomatic front, the front of world public opinion, and that front was the one most accessible for those of us in exile." their hosts -is that, at least in the immediate post-coup years, the Cubans were reticent to coordinate an armed insurgency in Chile. True, in public pronouncements after the coup, Castro referred to a future insurgency against the dictatorship. Chile showed "revolutions are not made with people alone; arms are also needed," he underlined on 28
September, speaking of "the hard and bloody struggle which the Chilean people will have to wage." But he left details vague and warned against hopes of immediate success:
We are absolutely certain that they [the Chilean people] will know how to confront fascism…We are absolutely certain that 11 September was the beginning of a struggle which will end only with the victory of the people. This will not occur immediately. Do not expect miracles in the Chilean situation. The people have been badly beaten and the parties and organizations will have to recover from the fascist blow. Central Committee planned to "educate the people to defend themselves from repression," "agitate all the problems the masses felt," "convince those who were 59 Interview with Oscar Soto Guzmán, What happened to this money once it reached Chile and what impact it had is less clear. As expected, Beatriz received confirmation that some of it had been shared out in small amounts between families of clandestine party members and relatives of those detained for food, medical bills, or lawyers. 83 Money also covered costs of accommodation, transport, and false documentation for underground cadres. 84 However, often, the most Beatriz knew was simply that the money had got to Chile, and even then rumors circulated that money was not reaching the right people. "If something worries me," Beatriz wrote to her aunt, Laura Allende, who was exiled in early 1975, "it is hearing that 'money doesn't arrive', 'that inside [Chile] comrades are dying of hunger,'
'that there are still no secure channels to send money,' that 'no one receives anything'
and to know that the Party has money in its account although it is not much." Moreover, she regretted that uncertainty, together with what she saw as insufficient gratitude by leftwing parties, was creating "a climate of mistrust" within the global solidarity movement. 85 Beyond having little control over the money that reached Chile, divisions between and within left-wing parties undermined the idea of solidarity with the resistance.
For as much as the Chilean Left purported to coordinate solidarity efforts, each party was divided regarding the coup's causes and appropriate strategies of resistance. Dealing with defeat involved first accounting for what had happened, which took up time and energy in these early years. Criticism, self-criticism, and acute recriminations between and within parties ensued. The PCCH blamed "ultraleftists" (i.e. radical sectors of the PS and the MIR) for having provoked the coup and alienated potential support for the UP.
Seeing the coup primarily as the result of political failures, it emphasized political resistance had to take precedence. The MIR pointed to the military problem and the advocating armed struggle. 86 In this context, formulating coherent strategies for opposing the dictatorship were understandably difficult. Until 1980, the PCCH opposed closer relations with the MIR and "ultraleftist" armed resistance, while the MIR argued that only armed struggle would overthrow the dictatorship. These disagreements between the PCCH and the MIR translated into arguments related to solidarity campaigns' emphasis that became "verbally violent." 87 The PS, meanwhile, spent the first few years after the coup turning in on itself and criticizing its own position before the coup. Based on how they interpreted the past, different factions disputed the efficacy of armed action, the structure of the party, and future priorities. 88 Differences between cadres inside Chile and those in exile caused a leadership crisis so extreme that the Party split in two at the end of the 1970s. The fact that the external PS leadership continued to support both underground PS factions in
Chile until 1976, sending them both money, confused the picture. 89 As the exiled PS have the capacity to cause the Chilean government considerable difficulty and embarrassment, but until they develop an internal capability in Chile, they will pose no real threat to the stability of the regime." 93 Lagos Salinas, the question was who to send it to. Suspending money transfers until she received further instructions, Beatriz urged the PS to improve its strategies: "accumulated hatred should make us more efficient in all areas," she wrote. 98 By November 1975, she was still urging Altamirano to "work seriously to create a climate of efficiency and trust, so as not to harm our comrades in Chile…the need for money is too drastic." The Party "needs lots of money to fight," she wrote, noting that she had recently managed to get a further $20,000 to Argentina and a total of $70,000 to Peru for transfer to Chile. 99 While Beatriz received news that money reached Buenos Aires and Lima, these routes for sending it to Chile were nevertheless progressively "burnt. The Cuban delegation at the United Nations also posted letters for Chilean exiles in Cuba using US post boxes. 109 And the choice of Peru as a route for sending money back to Chile was probably at least in part to do with the Cuban embassy there at the time.
Cuban diplomats in Lima definitely passed correspondence between Beatriz and exiles based there. 110 However, mostly, the Cubans pressed the Chilean Left to re-group, reorganize, unite, and wait for improved conditions in Chile. They also emphasized international activities to isolate the Junta from abroad, which exiles were already developing. Returning to fight against the dictatorship still remained the ultimate objective for many left-wing exiles. However, in the context of heavy losses and internal divisions between and within parties, the campaign to isolate the Junta internationally proved far less controversial and effective in this early phase of resistance.
DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTIONARIES
The international stage -and the United Nations in particular -has historically been an important battlefield for revolutionaries fighting against superior military forces. Using reports on Human Rights abuses, regular published Bulletins, and international conferences as weapons, exiles aimed to politically, diplomatically, economically, militarily, and culturally isolate the Junta, 111 This, in turn, meant working within international organizations, extensive travel, and disseminating news about Chile as widely as possible.
Left-wing leaders had realized the potential strengths of a diplomatic campaign against the Junta early on. As the exiled Socialist Party Senator, Maria Elena Carrera, wrote to Beatriz two months after the coup, foreign criticism -particularly from Western Europe -was "the only thing that the beasts fear." By contrast, the military did not appear to care about opinions from the socialist bloc, which they regarded as inevitably hostile and were not reliant on for trade. 112 In placed human rights at the forefront of its concerns when it came to opposing the dictatorship. As Patrick Kelly argues, as well as reflecting on the concrete crisis of human rights in Chile, its depoliticized language also avoided partisan struggles on the Left. 113 Moreover, focusing on human rights combined the twin goals of mobilizing global opposition to the Junta and saving lives. This was effective when it came to campaigns to free political prisoners inside Chile, with the dictatorship increasingly using mass exile as a way of closing down concentration camps that had been criticized. 114 The international solidarity movement, with active involvement of the Comité Chileno, also had an impact on individual cases: for example, helping ensure the release of Carmen Castillo, Miguel
Enriquez's partner, arrested in late 1974. 115 When it came to the campaign against the dictatorship's human rights violations, those working at the Comité Chileno in Havana mostly focused their attention on the United Nations. Specifically, they were able to work through Cuba's delegation in New York, to help promote a resolution condemning the Junta for human rights violations. 146 Not only did it remove a key figure in a growing Chilean-led transnational solidarity network spread between Cuba, Mexico, the United States, and the United Nations, but it also revealed the uphill struggle opponents of the regime faced against a fanatical dictatorship bent on murdering its enemies.
Within Chile, the dictatorship meanwhile strove hard to paint exiles like Letelier as "foreign," "anti-Chilean" threats and mobilize support for itself based on a new extreme version of Chilean nationalism that equated citizenship with loyalty to the dictatorship. The connection between Chilean exiles and the socialist bloc, and Cuba in particular, which had been so vital to the continued viability and existence of the Chilean Left in these years after the coup, was also used to great effect by an anti-communist dictatorship that saw itself as waging war on "foreign Marxism." Under the headline "La Connexión Cubana," El Mercurio published old letters from Beatriz found in Letelier's briefcase and seized by the FBI that discussed the money she was sending him and the dissemination of anti-Junta materials at the UN. Using her location in Havana, the paper claimed she was acting as a Cuban operative and that the "Kremlin's hand was behind Cuba were maintained, but they were largely conducted at a party level rather than via the Comité Chileno. With the situation in Chile improving as far as locally based opposition to the dictatorship, they also now shifted to the kind of training and clandestine support armed insurgency efforts that the Cubans had denied early on.
CONCLUSIONS

An examination of Chilean left-wing solidarity efforts from Cuba between 1973 and 1977
illustrates the enormity of the task that exiles faced immediately after the coup as well as the sheer intensity of their efforts. This is not to say that these represented coherent strategies or a clear vision for Chile's future. As we have seen, the Chilean Left was profoundly divided, as it had been before 1973, but now with growing intensity. At least for those in charge of the Comité Chileno in Havana that tried to collectively represent these tendencies on the Left and mobilize broad-based opposition to the dictatorship, solidarity in the first years after the coup meant using every available strategy at once.
In charting these different overlapping strategies, this article has sought to shed light on exile-led resistance from Havana, Cuba's role in facilitating this opposition to the dictatorship, and the relationship that it had with global solidarity networks after 1973. Beatriz's role in managing finances from Cuba, and Cuba's assistance in channeling money back to Chile was important, even if the amount that eventually reached Chile was never perceived as being enough. The Comité Chileno was also able to shape the way in which solidarity was framed through its dissemination of information, and its members' active participation in international campaigns. As Margaret Power has argued, the Chile solidarity movement was "successful…in both symbolic and practical terms.
One of the most important markers was its long-term ability to impact public perceptions, influence cultural productions, and affect media coverage of the Pinochet dictatorship."
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Chilean left-wing exiles' cooperation with friendly governments, parties, and nongovernmental organizations was thus vital for the increasingly internationalized battle they fought. Overall, from the perspective of Chileans on all sides, the outside world and its interaction with their own ideas, beliefs and agendas therefore mattered a great deal.
In this regard, Chile was a special case but not unique. As Cold War conflicts increasingly uprooted peoples around the world, particularly from the Third World, it forced them to seek refuge abroad, devise new means of communicating their ideas and pursuing their political agendas, and find international allies willing to help them. These networks, the internationalization of local struggles, and the fluidity of global interconnections that crisscrossed oceans and national borders therefore became an increasingly common feature of twentieth century global politics. Studying them is imperative if we are to 153 Power, "The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s," 47.
understand the full dimensions of Latin America's history during the late Cold War era.
Understanding the view from Havana and early resistance to the Chilean dictatorship helps identify these struggles' means and processes along with the global implications they had, even during periods of profound defeat and readjustment. It also contributes to recovering the broader history of the battle for Chile that began before 1973 and continued throughout the dictatorship until democracy was finally restored in 1990.
